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The O’Neill Institute for National and Global Health Law at Georgetown University is the
premier center for health law, scholarship and policy. Housed at Georgetown University Law
Center, in the heart of the nation’s capital, the Institute has the mission to provide innovative
solutions for the leading health problems in America and globally—from infectious and chronic
diseases to health care financing and health systems. The Institute, a joint project of the Law
Center and School of Nursing and Health Studies, also draws upon the University’s considerable
intellectual resources, including the School of Medicine, the Public Policy Institute, and the
Kennedy Institute of Ethics.
The essential vision for the O’Neill Institute rests upon the proposition that the law has
been, and will remain, a fundamental tool for solving critical health problems in our global,
national, and local communities. By contributing to a more powerful and deeper
understanding of the multiple ways in which law can be used to improve health, the O’Neill
Institute hopes to advance scholarship, research, and teaching that will encourage key decisionmakers in the public, private, and civil society sectors to employ the law as a positive tool for
enabling more people in the United States and throughout the world to lead healthier lives.


Teaching. Georgetown is educating future generations of students who will become – upon
their graduation – policymakers, health professionals, business leaders, scholars, attorneys,
physicians, nurses, scientists, diplomats, judges, chief executive officers, and leaders in many
other private, public, and nonprofit fields of endeavor. The O’Neill Institute helps to prepare
graduates to engage in multidisciplinary conversations about national and global health care
law and policy and to rigorously analyze the theoretical, philosophical, political, cultural,
economic, scientific, and ethical bases for understanding and addressing health problems.



Scholarship. O’Neill supports world-class research that is applied to urgent health problems,
using a complex, comprehensive, interdisciplinary, and transnational approach to go beyond
a narrow vision of health law that focuses solely on health care as an industry or as a
scientific endeavor.



Reflective Problem-Solving. For select high-priority issues, the O’Neill Institute organizes
reflective problem-solving initiatives in which the Institute seeks to bridge the gap between
key policymakers in the public, private, and civil society sectors and the intellectual talent
and knowledge that resides in academia.
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OVERVIEW
LEGAL SOLUTIONS IN HEALTH REFORM
The American public has increasingly identified health care as a key issue of concern. In order
to address the multiple problems relating to the access and affordability of health care, President
Obama and federal lawmakers across the political spectrum continue to call for major health
reform. In any debate on health reform, a predictable set of complex policy, management,
economic, and legal issues is likely to be raised. Due to the diverse interests involved, these
issues could lead to a series of high-stakes policy debates. Therefore, it is critical that
advocates of reform strategies anticipate such issues in order to decrease the likelihood that
legally resolvable questions become barriers to substantive health reform. In an effort to
frame and study legal challenges and solutions in advance of the heat of political debate, the
O’Neill Institute for National and Global Health Law at Georgetown University and the Robert
Wood Johnson Foundation have crafted the “Legal Solutions in Health Reform” project.
This project aims to identify practical, workable solutions to the kinds of legal issues that may
arise in any upcoming federal health reform debate. While other academic and research
organizations are exploring important policy, management, and economic questions relating to health
reform, the O’Neill Institute has focused solely on the critical legal issues relating to federal health
reform. The target audience includes elected officials and their staff, attorneys who work in key
executive and legislative branch agencies, private industry lawyers, academic institutions, and other
key players. This project attempts to pave the road towards improved health care for the nation
by providing stakeholders a concise analysis of the complex legal issues relating to health
reform, and a clear articulation of the range of solutions available.

LEGAL ISSUES V. POLICY ISSUES
Among the major issues in federal health reform, there are recurring questions that are policybased and those that are legally-based. Many times questions of policy and of law overlap and
cannot be considered in isolation. However, for the purpose of this project, we draw the
distinction between law and policy based on the presence of clear legal permission or
prohibition.
Under this distinction, policy issues include larger-scale questions such as what basic model of
health reform to use, as well as more technical questions such as what threshold to use for
poverty level subsidies and cost-sharing for preventive services. In contrast, legal issues are
those involving constitutional, statutory, or regulatory questions such as whether the Constitution
allows a certain congressional action or whether particular laws run parallel or conflict.
Based on this dividing line of clear permission or prohibition, policy questions can be framed as
those beginning with, “Should we…?”, and legal questions can be framed as those beginning
with, “Can we…?” The focus of this paper will be the latter, broken into three particular
categories: 1) “Under the Constitution, can we ever…?”; 2) “Under current statutes and
regulations, can we now…?”; 3) “ Under the current regulatory scheme, how do we…?” This
final set of questions tends to be mixed questions of policy, law, and good legislative drafting.
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PURPOSE AND LAYOUT OF THE PROJECT
This project is an effort to frame and study legal challenges and solutions in advance of the heat
of political debate. This effort is undertaken with the optimistic view that all legal problems
addressed are either soluble or avoidable. Rather than setting up roadblocks, this project is a
constructive activity, attempting to pave the road towards improved health care for the nation.
Consequently, it does not attempt to create consensus solutions for the identified problems nor is
it an attempt to provide a unified field theory of how to provide health insurance in America.
Furthermore, this project does not attempt to choose among the currently competing proposals or
make recommendations among them. Instead, it is a comprehensive project written to provide
policy makers, attorneys, and other key stakeholders with a concise analysis of the complex legal
issues relating to health reform and a clear articulation of the range of solutions available for
resolving those questions.

LEGAL ISSUES
Based on surveys of current health policy meetings and agendas, popular and professional press,
and current health reform proposals, our team formulated a list of legal issues relating to federal
health reform. After much research, discussion, and expert advice and review, our initial list of
over 50 legal issues was narrowed to ten. An initial framing paper was drafted which identified
these ten legal issues and briefly outlined the main components of each. In May of 2008, a
bipartisan consultation session was convened to provide concrete feedback on the choice and
framing of the legal issues. The attendees of the consultation session included congressional
staff, executive branch officials, advocates, attorneys, employers, and representatives of a wide
range of interests affected by health reform. Feedback and analysis from this session further
narrowed the ten issues to eight key legal issues which warranted in depth analysis of the current
law.
These eight pertinent issues are truly legal in nature and must be addressed in any significant
reform proposal to avoid needless debate or pitfalls as policy decisions are made. There are
multiple other legal issues that will arise as the discussion evolves and, if a federal policy is
adopted, the system changes. In this project, however, we have targeted the issues essential for
an immediate discussion of federal health reform.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Prepared by the O’Neill Institute
INTRODUCTION:
The increased use of health information technology (health IT) is a common element of nearly
every health reform proposal because it has the potential to decrease costs, improve health
outcomes, coordinate care, and improve public health. However, it raises concerns about
security and privacy of medical information. This paper examines some of the “gaps” in privacy
protections that arise out of the current federal health privacy standard, the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability (HIPAA) Privacy Rule, the main federal law which governs the
use and disclosure of health information. Additionally, it puts forth a range of possible solutions,
accompanied by arguments for and against each. The solutions provide some options for
strengthening the current legal framework of privacy protections in order to build public trust in
health IT and facilitate its use for health reform. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
(ARRA) enacted in February 2009 includes a number of changes to HIPAA and its regulations,
and those changes are clearly noted among the list of solutions (and ARRA is indicated below
where the Act has a relevant provision).
LAW IN EFFECT PRE-ARRA AND PERCEIVED “GAPS”:
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA): The use of health
information is currently covered by HIPAA and its implementing regulations. The Department
of Health and Human Services (HHS) issued final regulations in 2002, which became effective
for most entities covered by HIPAA in 2003. The HIPAA privacy regulations set forth rules
governing the access, use, and disclosure of personal health information by most traditional
health care entities. The goal of the regulations is to ensure that health information is rapidly
accessible to those authorized, but kept confidential and protected from inappropriate use.
 Who is covered: The Privacy Rule only applies to entities expressly defined in the
HIPAA statute, which places unmentioned, new, and emerging entities outside the direct
coverage of the rule.
 What is covered: The Privacy Rule regulates the type of health information that can be
shared by covered entities and for what purposes. But individuals are concerned that
their personal health information will not be protected in the emerging e-health
environment. For example, privacy may be at risk due to the lack of federal notification
standards for breaches; the possibility that developments in technology may make “deidentified” data (not covered under the Privacy Rule) re-identifiable; and the lack of
strong prohibition on the use of personal health information for marketing purposes.
 State law variation: The Privacy Rule is only a minimum standard, which gives states
the power to enact more stringent protections for health privacy. The resulting variations
in state privacy laws may pose an obstacle to health information exchange across state
lines and/or to a national health information system.
 Insufficient comprehension of and compliance with the Privacy Rule and
enforcement: Entities covered by the Privacy Rule and individuals/patients do not
adequately comprehend the Privacy Rule’s provisions, leading health care entities to
either over- or under-interpret the Rule and leaving individuals unaware of their privacy
rights. In addition, there has been debate among policymakers and stakeholders over 1)
whether the Rule to date has been appropriately enforced; 2) whether or not the current
mechanisms are adequate to ensure compliance; and 3) what the limits of the
enforcement mechanisms should be.
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POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS:
The perceived “gaps” in federal legal protections for health information can be grouped into four
categories: 1) who is covered; 2) what is covered; 3) state law variation; and 4) insufficient
comprehension of and compliance with privacy protections. The solutions range from amending
existing law or regulation to encouraging private action through market or other incentives.
 Who is covered: Amend HIPAA to create new categories of covered entities and require
the federal agencies to issue new privacy regulations to cover activities of new entities;
revise regulations and expand recent guidance on business associate agreements to
include all health information exchanges in existence or development (ARRA); require
all entities handling health information to adopt policies consistent with fair information
practices; and/or keep the law in its current state and encourage adoption of good privacy
practices through voluntary business agreements.
 What is covered: Enact federal legislation prohibiting the use of personal heath
information to determine the terms and conditions of employment or health insurance;
establish a federal breach notification law applicable to identifiable health information
(ARRA); seek the input of experts and public to examine the de-identification safe
harbor exception (ARRA); create more options for the use of health data stripped of some
individual identifiers (ARRA) and require data use agreements for all data disclosures;
require those obtaining data stripped of patient identifiers to commit to keeping data deidentified except in certain circumstances; strengthen, establish, and increase compliance
with HIPAA rules regarding the use of personal information for marketing (ARRA);
adopt rules governing marketing uses by non-covered entities such as Internet health
sites; issue more guidance on how to comply with the Privacy Rule (ARRA); issue new
regulations regarding terms of access to health information exchanges.
 State law variation: “Wipe the slate clean” and have Congress could establish a new
federal privacy law that preempts existing state laws but allows states to pass new
stronger privacy provisions; and/or keep the status quo with the federal standard as a
floor.
 Improving comprehension of and compliance with the Privacy Rule and
enforcement: Revise the Privacy Rule to make it less complex; provide more guidance
and better education on the requirements of the rules (ARRA); improve consumer
education on HIPAA rights by requiring entities to provide a summary notice; ensure a
proper enforcement regime for entities not covered by HIPAA that handle personal health
information; amend HIPAA enforcement to clarify enforcement authority and also direct
the Secretary to pursue civil actions (ARRA); amend HIPAA to allow the Secretary to
directly enforce HIPAA regulations against business associates (ARRA); and/or amend
HIPAA to allow a private right of action (ARRA).
CONCLUSION:
Generally, there is consensus that efforts to facilitate widespread adoption and use of health
information technology must move forward with appropriate protections for privacy and
security. However, achieving consensus on the details of what privacy and security measures
need to be put in place continues to be a challenge. The new Administration and Congress are
moving forward to increase the use of health IT. Any efforts to reform the nation’s health
systems and to increase the adoption of health IT will need to address the concerns surrounding
the privacy and security of personal health information.
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Legal Solutions in Health Reform:
Privacy and Health Information Technology
Deven McGraw*
Introduction
In discussions of health reform, the increased use of health information technology (health IT) is
a common element of nearly every serious proposal on the table. Health IT includes electronic
health records kept by providers, personal health records offered by health insurance plans or
owned by consumers, and electronic health information exchanges. Although health reform
initiatives being discussed contain little detail regarding health IT, in general they promote health
IT to facilitate the electronic sharing of health information to improve individual and population
health. During the 2008 Presidential Campaign, the health care proposals of both President
Obama and Senator McCain discussed health IT. President Obama’s proposal invests $50 billion
over the next five years to promote the adoption of health IT with privacy safeguards. 1 Senator
McCain’s plan also encouraged the adoption of health IT, with an emphasis on coordination. 2
Proponents hope that the increased use of health IT will improve health outcomes for individual
patients by facilitating the delivery of evidence-based care and reducing medical errors.
Additionally, proponents hope that increasing information sharing among providers will better
coordinate care within and across health care settings. Health IT facilitates the creation of a
comprehensive health record that can move with an individual over his or her lifetime, in
contrast to the fragmented records that exist today. Further, health IT is promoted as a critical
tool for improving population health by allowing for the more efficient gathering of data
regarding the effectiveness of certain treatments. Finally, health IT is also expected to help
decrease health care costs by reducing the duplication of services and the delivery of unnecessary
or inappropriate care.
This paper briefly summarizes current federal health privacy law and examines some “gaps” in
privacy protections that have been identified by some policymakers and stakeholders in recent
debates on this topic. Additionally, the paper puts forth a range of possible solutions,
accompanied by some arguments for and against each idea. The proposals in the paper do not
represent the universe of possible solutions to each issue; many of them also are not mutually
exclusive. The arguments provided in support for or against a particular idea also do not
represent all of the arguments for or against any policy option. The solutions do, however,
provide some options for continuing the conversation about how we can best strengthen our legal
framework of privacy protections to build public trust in health IT and facilitate its use to reform
the health care system.
Note: The initial version of this paper was completed before enactment of the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act in February 2009 (“ARRA”). 3 ARRA includes a number of
provisions amending the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) and its
regulations, the main federal law which governs the use and disclosure of health information.
Because much of the details of the privacy and security provisions in ARRA will need to be
fleshed out in agency guidance or regulations, and because most of the provisions do not take
effect until at least a year after enactment, the author of this paper decided not to completely
revise the paper to incorporate the changes in the law. Instead, where there is a provision in
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ARRA dealing with an issue identified in this paper, a brief summary of that provision is clearly
indicated within the list of solutions.
There is widespread agreement that protecting individuals’ health information is necessary in
order to build public trust in e-health systems and to help drive the widespread adoption of health
IT. But unlike other topics addressed in the Legal Solutions in Health Reform project, current
health privacy laws arguably do not pose a legal obstacle to health IT. For example, there are no
federal health privacy laws that prohibit or directly inhibit the sharing of information
electronically for health purposes and that require specific action to resolve. Instead, the debate
centers more around whether current health privacy laws are sufficient to build a foundation of
trust in health IT that will support an information sharing environment that will improve health
care and our health care system – and if not, what more needs to be done. This makes the path to
resolution more difficult, as stakeholders may hold very different opinions about the extent of the
problem and the appropriate solutions.
Survey data show that a large majority of the public wants electronic access to their health
information – both for themselves and for their health care providers – because they believe such
access is likely to increase the quality of their health care. At the same time, people have
significant concerns about the privacy of their health information on-line. In a 2006 survey,
when Americans were asked about the benefits of and concerns about online health information:





80% were very concerned about identity theft or fraud;
77% were very concerned about their medical information being used for marketing
purposes;
56% were concerned about employers having access to their health information; and
53% were concerned about insurers gaining access to this information. 4

Health IT is better equipped than are paper records to protect sensitive personal health
information. For example, it is often impossible to tell whether someone has inappropriately
accessed a paper record. By contrast, technology - including strong user authentication and
tracking mechanisms - can be employed to automatically limit and monitor access to electronic
health information. Additionally, electronic health information exchange networks can be
designed to facilitate data sharing among health care entities for appropriate purposes without
needing to create new, centralized databases of sensitive information that will be attractive
targets for marketers and those seeking health data for commercial gain, or that can be vulnerable
to security breaches. If a system is breached, sensitive data can be protected, in part, by
encryption and other security methods. Technology can never be made 100% tamperproof – but
it can be more protective than paper records at preventing inappropriate access to information
and helping ensure that when there is abuse, the perpetrators will be detected and punished.
At the same time, absent strong privacy and security safeguards, the computerization of personal
health information can magnify the risk to privacy. Tens of thousands of health records can be
accessed through a single breach. 5 Recent headlines about breaches of electronic records
underscore these concerns. The cumulative effect of reports of data breaches and inappropriate
access to medical records deepens consumer distrust in the ability of electronic health
information systems to provide adequate privacy and security protections.
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Failing to address public concerns about the privacy of their health information could have
significant consequences. Without appropriate protections for privacy and security in the
healthcare system, some patients engage in “privacy-protective” behaviors to avoid having their
personal health information used inappropriately. 6 According to a recent poll, one in six adults
(17%) – representing about 38 million persons – say they withhold information from their health
providers due to worries about how the medical data might be disclosed. 7 Persons who report
that they are in fair or poor health and racial and ethnic minorities (who report even higher levels
of concern about the privacy of their personal medical records) are more likely than average to
practice privacy-protective behaviors. 8 Due to the reality of privacy risks associated with the
computerization of health information, the movement to e-health could increase the percentage
of people who engage in privacy protective behaviors. Ignoring these concerns – or inadequately
addressing them – will significantly threaten public trust in these new systems.
In general, stakeholders largely agree that entities that handle electronic personal health
information should be subject to a baseline set of privacy standards. This consensus breaks
down, however, when the discussion gets to the details. For example:


Do we extend the privacy rules under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act (HIPAA) to all entities that now handle health information, or create new legal
standards for entities not currently covered?



What protections need to be in place? For example, do we rely on current HIPAA rules
or are modifications needed, either to address new challenges or because the rules, in the
view of some, were imperfect from the start?



Are these concerns best addressed through changes in statute or regulations, or is it best
to police this nascent marketplace through business best practices (or a combination of
both)?



Should we allow for some state law variation or establish federal standards that preempt
the field?



What should we do to ensure compliance with and appropriate enforcement of privacy
protections?

.
A brief list of all proposed solutions in each category (without explanatory text and without the
sample arguments for and against) can be found at Appendix A at the end of this paper.
I. Federal Law Prior to Passage of ARRA (as noted above, changes to law enacted in
ARRA are set forth below in the “possible solutions” proposed for each issue)
With respect to protecting health information privacy, public policymakers are not faced with a
blank slate. Within the traditional healthcare system, uses of health information are covered by
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) and its implementing
regulations. When Congress enacted HIPAA to facilitate, among other things, the electronic
transmission of health care claims to reduce administrative costs, lawmakers recognized the need
to protect the privacy and security of health information when data moves electronically.
Congress gave itself two years to enact federal privacy legislation – but ended up tasking the
Department of Health and Human Services to promulgate privacy and security regulations to
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cover information transactions under the purview of HIPAA. The regulations were finalized in
2002 and effective for most entities covered by HIPAA by 2003. The HIPAA statute sets forth
the definition of entities covered by the law and important provisions with respect to HIPAA
enforcement; the bulk of the HIPAA privacy and security requirements are in the regulations.
The HIPAA privacy regulations – known collectively as the “Privacy Rule” – are based on fair
information practices and set forth rules governing the access, use, and disclosure of personal
health information (or “protected health information”) 9 by most traditional health care system
entities (for example, providers, hospitals, laboratories, pharmacies, and health plans). In
summary, the Privacy Rule permits covered entities 10 to access, use, and disclose “protected
health information” 11 for purposes of treatment, 12 payment, 13 and health care operations. 14 The
Rule also allows access, use, and disclosure for 1) certain lawful public health purposes, as
required by law, 2) reporting abuse or domestic violence, 3) health oversight activities, 4)
judicial and administrative proceedings, and 5) law enforcement purposes. Covered entities may
disclose information to family members, and in facility or office directories, as long as the
patient doesn’t object. All other purposes not specifically mentioned in the Rule require prior
patient authorization to access, use, or disclose information. The Privacy Rule applies to
identifiable health information regardless of whether it is in paper or electronic form.
HIPAA provides a federal floor, or minimum standard, of privacy protection. It expressly
preserves State laws that provide stronger privacy protections for health information. 15 Such
State privacy laws include more stringent requirements regarding access, use and disclosure of
particularly sensitive categories of health information, such as mental health records and HIV
testing and treatment records. The variation in state laws poses difficulties to a uniform privacy
standard.
Other federal laws apply privacy protections to specific types of information, or have limited
application in specific contexts. For example, the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of
2008 prohibits employers from using genetic information to make employment decisions and
prohibits health insurers from using such information to make coverage and underwriting
determinations. 16 The Federal Education Rights and Privacy Act, the regulations governing
substance abuse treatment facilities receiving federal funds (commonly known as Part 2), and the
Privacy Act of 1974 cover only certain settings of care. 17
With respect to health information on-line or in consumer-owned personal health records, the
Federal Trade Commission can use its “unfair and deceptive trade practices” authority to hold
some entities accountable for failure to comply with their privacy policies. Federal law does not
require these entities to have a privacy policy, or require that certain elements be included in
such a policy if it exists. Some have said that the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
(ECPA) protects personal health records (PHRs) because it prohibits the vendors of those
services from disclosing the contents of those records without the authorization of the record
holder. However, the relevant ECPA provision applies only to services that are offered to the
public. 18 PHRs available exclusively to employees of a particular company, for example, likely
fall outside of this part of ECPA. Moreover, ECPA applies only if the provider is not authorized
to access the contents of a customer’s records for purposes of providing any services other than
storage or computer processing. 19 This caveat may knock out a lot of PHRs that provide services
beyond data storage, or that are advertising-based and analyze individual patient records to target
ads.
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To keep this paper to a manageable length, it focuses on federal privacy protections that are (or
could be) more broadly applicable.
II. Possible Issues to be Resolved
The perceived “gaps” in pre-ARRA federal legal protections for health information can be
grouped into the following categories:


Who is Covered: The HIPAA Privacy Rule covers only certain “covered entities” as
defined in the HIPAA statute: specifically, providers, plans, and healthcare
clearinghouses. Many of the new entities storing, handling or managing personal
health information electronically do not qualify as covered entities, and thus are not
directly covered by the Privacy Rule. As noted above, other federal health privacy
laws apply only in specific contexts or are otherwise limited in their application. As a
result, there is no baseline set of federal health privacy protections that apply to all
entities that handle personal health information.



What is Covered: The Privacy Rule is based on a model of one-to-one electronic
transmission of health information among traditional health care system entities and
their business partners who perform health-related functions on their behalf. Since
the HIPAA requirements were enacted and promulgated, new opportunities to access
and disclose health information have arisen (e.g., electronic health information
exchanges) which can enhance access to greater volumes of identifiable health
information more effectively and efficiently. The Rule also did not envision the rise
of personal health records designed for use by consumers. Some believe that truly
building public trust in e-health systems requires strengthening a number of the
Privacy Rule’s current provisions and/or the promulgation of new or additional legal
protections. Others believe the Privacy Rule provides sufficient protections for health
information in the new e-health environment, and that policymakers merely need to
extend its coverage to apply to entities that did not exist when the Privacy Rule was
implemented. Similarly, some have suggested approaching this question by focusing
only on what is new in the e-health environment – new actors or new ways to access,
use, or disclose information not contemplated when the HIPAA regulations were
implemented – in order to avoid getting mired in old debates about the current
HIPAA regulations.



State Law Variation: As noted above, HIPAA provides a floor of health privacy
protection. State laws that provide more stringent protections for health privacy are
expressly preserved and not preempted. Some are concerned that the multiplicity of
state privacy laws will create an obstacle to cross-state or nationwide electronic
exchange of health information. The obstacles may arise because of the operation of
a state law that prohibits information sharing except under certain circumstances
(such as with patient consent or authorization), or because health care entities are
afraid to disclose information in a way that might violate an applicable state law.
Others suggest that any information sharing obstacles are primarily due to a lack of
understanding and varying interpretations of state laws, which does not necessarily
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justify eliminating stronger state privacy protections and enacting a single federal
standard.


Improving Understanding of (and Compliance with) Privacy Protections: Even
five years after the Privacy Rule went into effect, there is still a great deal of
confusion on the part of some entities covered by the Rule about its provisions. For
example, the 34 state teams participating in the Agency for Healthcare Research and
Quality (AHRQ)-funded Privacy and Security Solutions for Interoperable Health
Information Exchange consistently found a “general lack of understanding about
some of the basic tenets” of the Privacy Rule as well as of state laws concerning
health information disclosure. 20 The frequent result is a more conservative
interpretation of the law – a reluctance to disclose information even in circumstances
where it is expressly permitted – which could create unnecessary and sometimes
inappropriate barriers to electronic health information exchange. 21 Patients and their
families also rarely understand the provisions of the HIPAA privacy notice, which is
the vehicle in the Privacy Rule for informing patients about the potential uses of their
health information and their rights under the Rule. 22

A. Who Is Covered
As noted above, HIPAA by statute covers only providers (including health care professionals,
hospitals, pharmacies, laboratories), health plans, and healthcare clearinghouses. 23 Thus the
HIPAA privacy and security regulations also apply only to these covered entities. Under the
Privacy Rule, a covered entity can contract with a “business associate:” an organization that
receives personal health information to perform activities or services on behalf of the covered
entity, but is not part of their workforce. The HIPAA rules do not apply directly to business
associates; instead, business associates must be obligated by contract with the covered entity to
comply with the HIPAA regulations. A business associate must enter into a “business associate
agreement” with the covered entity in order to access protected health information. 24 This
agreement must: 1) spell out the required uses and disclosures of such information by the
business associate, 2) include a provision prohibiting the business associate from further using or
disclosing the data other than as permitted in the contract or required by law, and 3) contain
“satisfactory assurances” that the business associate will “appropriately safeguard the
information.” 25 The HIPAA rules cannot be enforced by the federal government against
business associates, as discussed in more detail below.
HIPAA currently does not cover a number of entities that have emerged as part of the movement
to electronic health records. For example:


State and regional electronic health information exchanges – often called Regional Health
Information Organizations (or RHIOs) or Health Information Exchanges (HIEs) – and
ePrescribing Gateways, all of which may collect or facilitate the exchange of personal
health information, usually among health care system entities, are not HIPAA covered
entities. 26 In December 2008 HHS issued guidance clarifying that health information
networks that merely exchange data on behalf of covered entities must be business
associates and thus must execute business associate agreements. 27 However, such
guidance does not cover all of the health information exchanges currently in existence or
in development. For example, exchanges that collect and directly access information in a
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centralized database are not covered by this guidance, and as a result their status under
HIPAA is unclear.


Personal health records (PHRs) and other consumer-facing health IT tools now being
created by Internet companies like Microsoft, Google, and WebMD, as well as by
employers (for example, Dossia, the consortium of eight of America’s largest employers),
are not covered by HIPAA. 28 Because these tools are being designed for primary use by
the consumer, individual authorization is typically required in order to move information
into or out of a PHR. As a result, the vendors of these products have concluded that a
business associate agreement is not required; OCR has issued no guidance on this
practice.



Personal health information is migrating onto the Internet through an array of health
information sites, online support groups, and other on-line health tools. Often this
information is voluntarily posted or shared by individuals. These potential repositories of
sensitive health information are not covered by HIPAA as either covered entities or
business associates – and privacy protections are guaranteed primarily through
enforcement by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) of the general prohibition against
unfair and deceptive trade practices, such as a failure to follow promises made in a
privacy policy.

The gaps in HIPAA coverage of these new entities is of concern to some policymakers and
industry stakeholders and may be an obstacle to promoting the use of these new technologies.
For example, the public may not trust that their information will be protected when it is
exchanged or stored electronically because these non-covered entities are not required to comply
with any minimum health information privacy standards. Covered entities may be concerned
about an unlevel playing field, where their products and services are required to be compliant
with current law and the products and services of their competitors are not.
Possible Solutions
Section 13408 of ARRA clarifies that entities transmitting or processing data on behalf of
covered entities, like Regional Health Information Organizations (RHIOs), Health
Information Exchanges, or E-Prescribing Gateways, are business associates for purposes of
HIPAA. Section 13408 also provides that vendors who contract with a covered entity in
order to allow that entity, as part of its electronic health records, to offer patients a
personal health record, must also be business associates. Section 13424 requires HHS,
working with the FTC, to issue a report within one year of enactment recommending
privacy and security protections for information accessed and stored on-line. This study
must include a recommendation for which agency should have oversight over uses of health
information on the Internet and a timetable for regulation.
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 Amend HIPAA to create new categories of covered entities and require the Office of
Civil Rights (OCR) to promulgate new privacy regulations to cover the activities of these
new entities.
Arguments For
o Arguably provides the most certainty to the market and a more level playing field
(even if the regulations applied to these new entities are tailored to the particular
challenges raised by each, as is the case today among the major categories of covered
entities). (steps to accomplish taken in ARRA)
Arguments Against
o This could be difficult to achieve, as some entities may resist coverage under HIPAA;
others may welcome a more certain legal environment.
o With respect to PHRs, some have argued that HIPAA may not be the appropriate
vehicle for regulating those provided by non-health care entities. For example, The
National Committee for Vital and Health Statistics (NCVHS) called for protections at
least equal to HIPAA to be extended to all PHRs – but did not recommend extending
HIPAA to do so. 29 The Center for Democracy & Technology has argued that HIPAA
will not address the particular concerns raised by the handling of personal health
information by Internet-based companies and other non-health care entities. 30 Two of
the prominent House bills from the 110th Congress – the “Protecting Records,
Optimizing Treatment, and Easing Communication Through Health Care Technology
Act of 2008” (the PRO (TECH) T Act) (H.R. 6357) and the “Health-e Information
Technology Act of 2008” (H.R. 6898) (referred to collectively in this paper as the
“House bills”) - instead called on HHS and FTC to work together to come up with
recommendations (or regulations) for privacy protections for information in PHRs. 31
o This concern could be ameliorated by ensuring that all health care entities (including
exchanges) that handle personal health information are required to comply with
HIPAA (either as covered entities or business associates, depending on their structure
and function), and imposing new standards on non-health care entities that provide
protections similar to HIPAA but that are targeted to address the particular concerns
raised in this environment.
 Require (or encourage) HHS to issue new regulations or guidance to clarify that entities
such as health information exchanges or PHRs that receive protected health information
from a covered entity must enter into a business associate agreement and at least be
contractually bound to safeguard the information and comply with HIPAA. (partially
addressed in ARRA)
Arguments For
o Does not require legislative action, thus potentially could be accomplished promptly
in 2009.
Arguments Against
o Would likely apply only to those entities that are receiving protected health
information from a covered entity and thus would not protect personal health
information entered into PHRs or onto Internet health sites directly by individuals.
Also, the business associate model currently applies to entities performing tasks on
behalf of a covered entity (emphasis added). Thus this model may make sense for
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health information exchanges (or at least those that are operating for the benefit of
their covered entity participants); but it makes less sense for PHRs, which operate for
the benefit of the consumer.
o Business associates are contractually obligated to adopt health information safeguards
or to comply with HIPAA. However, as discussed in more detail below, federal
authorities cannot hold them accountable for failure to comply with HIPAA.
 Require any entity that holds or manages protected health information to adopt policies
that are consistent with fair information practices, which is the model typically relied on
to establish appropriate policies for handling personal information. 32
Arguments For
o Model is endorsed by NCVHS and the Markle Foundation’s Connecting for Health
multi-stakeholder initiative.
o Ensures that anyone who handles personal health information is subject to at least a
uniform baseline set of standards.
o Eliminates need to continue to revisit this issue as the market evolves and new
entities/models for sharing health information are introduced.
o Partial coverage can be achieved by imposing the requirement as a federal funding
condition.
o Model is more consistent with data privacy standards adopted by the European
Commission, thus helping resolve a potential barrier to global data exchange.
Arguments Against
o Could result in HIPAA requirements for some entities and other, less onerous
requirements for other entities.
o Fair information practices (FIPs) provide a good model for moving forward – but
FIPs are articulated so broadly that building trust in electronic health information
sharing may require more clearly defined rules (and achieving broad support for such
rules may be difficult).
o If new framework deviates significantly from current HIPAA rules, there will be
costs and disruptions in information flows due to covered entities and their business
associates having to adjust to new or even dual standards. Further, the resources
already spent coming into compliance with HIPAA will be wasted. (Note that these
concerns could be ameliorated by building on the current HIPAA rules or by applying
new standards only to entities not currently covered by HIPAA).
 Keep the law in its current state and encourage the adoption of good privacy practices
through voluntary business agreements and/or certification.
Arguments For
o Requires no further action from Congress or the Administration.
o Less stringent approach arguably allows for more innovative responses to addressing
privacy and security issues.
Arguments Against
o Compliance through voluntary business agreements or certification (or other
voluntary business commitments) will not achieve a uniform baseline of protections.
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Consumers do not always have the option to choose providers, plans or other health
services based on privacy and security practices when care is needed and resources
are scarce.
o Will be perceived by some stakeholders as a lack of response to the privacy and
security concerns raised by e-health; thus, may not accomplish much with respect to
building trust in e-health systems.
o Requires covered entities to continue the expense and administrative efforts to
comply with the HIPAA privacy requirements and allows other entities working in
the same space to be relieved of these corresponding responsibilities and expenses.
B. What Is Covered
Electronic health information exchanges and the rise of consumer-focused health management
tools hold great potential for improving the flow of information necessary for good health care
and helping individuals take a greater role in improving their own health. But to realize this
potential, consumers need to trust that their personal health information will be kept private,
confidential, and secure. As information becomes more accessible and moves more freely in an
electronic exchange environment, current policies regarding access to, and use and disclosure of,
health information may be inadequate and contribute to a lack of public trust in health IT.
A number of the issues discussed below relate to perceived deficiencies in the HIPAA Privacy
Rule. Some argue that it makes little sense to try to re-open the compromises that were reached
in the current Privacy Rule and instead urge policymakers to focus on how best to address the
new challenges raised by the emerging e-health environment. Others argue that perceived
deficiencies in the Rule will need to be addressed in order to build trust in e-health, regardless of
the source of the problem. The following have been raised as issues that may need to be
addressed in order to remove distrust as an obstacle to the widespread adoption of health IT and
health information exchange.
1. Addressing Privacy Concerns Through Anti-Discrimination Laws
Some have suggested dealing with privacy concerns by prohibiting the use of personal health
information to discriminate against individuals with respect to health insurance and employment
- two of the key privacy concerns raised by consumers. This is the approach taken in the Genetic
Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (GINA), which prohibits the use of genetic
information to make health insurance coverage determinations and in employment-related
decisions. Some believe that passing anti-discrimination legislation based on health information
or health status 33 would address the most critical privacy concerns and relieve the pressure to
enact standards that “micromanage” an entity’s use of health information, which could create
obstacles to the information sharing that can improve individual health and the U.S. healthcare
system.
Possible Solutions
 Enact federal legislation prohibiting the use of personal health information in determining
the terms and conditions of employment or health insurance coverage.
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Arguments For
o As noted above, addresses the most critical consumer fears about use of their health
information; could obviate need for specific, detailed provisions on information uses
for other purposes.
Arguments Against
o Raises larger public policy issues that in the past have been difficult to resolve and
that should be discussed in the broader context of health reform (e.g., to what extent
employers can use health status in making employment decisions, particularly where
fitness for duty is a work issue; and to what extent should government (particularly
the federal government) regulate the business of insurance, which is dependent on the
ability to assess and manage health claims risk).
o May be more difficult than enacting specific standards governing use of information
in a range of other contexts; even if anti-discrimination legislation could be enacted, it
wouldn’t necessarily resolve all privacy concerns.
2. Lack of a Federal Breach Notification Standard
Prior to passage of ARRA, there was no federal law requiring that individuals be notified if their
personal health information is breached – i.e., inadvertently disclosed to or accessed by the
public or persons or entities not authorized to see it. A number of states have enacted laws
requiring persons to be notified if their personal data is breached. Only three of these laws
explicitly apply to identifiable health information, 34 but some general state breach notification
laws may be interpreted to apply to health information. 35 As a result, individuals only had a
right to be notified if their personal health information is inappropriately accessed or disclosed if
they happened to live in a state with an applicable law, or if their information was breached by
an organization that voluntarily provides breach notification as part of its risk mitigation
practices. Receiving notice of health data breaches gives individuals an opportunity to prepare
or to try to minimize any potential damage (if possible). A breach notification requirement also
arguably provides incentives for holders of health data to take the strongest measures possible to
protect against breach.
Possible Solutions
Sections 13402 and 13407 of ARRA establish a federal breach notification law that applies
to entities covered by HIPAA and vendors of personal health records and other Internetbased health entities.
 Establish a federal breach notification law that applies to identifiable health information.
(arguably accomplished in ARRA)
Arguments For
o Establishes a national right of individuals to be notified if health information is
breached and establishes national consensus on what constitutes a breach.
o Enactment of a strong federal standard could help facilitate stakeholder agreement for
preemption of state health information breach notification laws, which would provide
a more consistent policy environment for organizations that operate nationwide.
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o Could be done by regulation (modification to the Privacy Rule) with respect to
covered entities.
Arguments Against
o Could be difficult to come to consensus on the trigger for breach notification.
However, without such a standard, consumers could be inundated with alerts about
data breaches that do not involve their information, where there is little chance data
recipients could access their personal information, or that the breach would be used to
harm them. California, for example, imposes a strict liability standard – requiring
notification except in cases where the data is encrypted. Other states follow a harmbased standard – requiring notification only if the individual suffers some type of
harm. Consumer advocates argue that defining “harm” with respect to breaches of
personal health information requires a standard beyond financial harm, such as
discrimination, stigma, or embarrassment. Data holders may find it difficult to
determine whether or not a particular breach rises to this standard; consumers may
not trust data holders to appropriately make this determination on their behalf.
o If requirement applies only to covered entities, it leaves out many organizations and
institutions that hold or manage personal health information, including: HIPAA
business associates (who could be required in regulation to notify the covered entity
of any breach); PHRs offered by non-HIPAA covered entities; and Internet health
sites that collect personal health information. Imposing a requirement to notify
individuals of breaches on these entities would require a law of broader application,
which may be more difficult to enact.
 Status quo (i.e., leave for states to address or to market forces).
Arguments For
o Companies will develop more innovative technologies for protecting information if
they compete based on their privacy and security policies and practices, including
those dealing with breach notification.
o It is not clear that that this is a new issue raised by the movement to electronic
records, which suggests it is not something that needs to be addressed at this time.
Arguments Against
o It is unclear that this is something the market alone will fix. Entities holding health
information would likely come to different conclusions as to whether or not it is
necessary to notify in the event of a breach.
o Breaches of greater volumes of records are more likely to occur as we store and move
information electronically. Failure to address this issue creates an obstacle to
building trust in e-health systems.
o Relying on states is unlikely to achieve protection for all patients.
o Continuing to leave this to state law exacerbates the inconsistent policy environment
for health care entities that operate nationally or across state lines.
3. Need for Data Stripped of Patient Identifiers for a Range of Health Purposes
The major health reform proposals all require the robust collection of health data for a number of
purposes, including: measuring provider performance; determining whether particular treatments
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are effective; monitoring health data for safety signals with respect to new drugs and devices;
health research; public health surveillance and bioterrorism; and for commercial purposes (for
example, determining how often providers are prescribing a particular drug product). The
Privacy Rule permits the use or disclosure of identifiable information for some of these purposes,
including: quality assessment and improvement activities; public health reporting; and for health
care operations such as the credentialing and licensing of health care professionals. However,
some of these activities occur now with the use of information stripped of patient identifiers, and
some privacy advocates have begun calling for increased use of data stripped of patient
identifiers in lieu of using fully identifiable information where it is possible to do so and still
accomplish the purpose for which the data was legitimately accessed.
The Privacy Rule includes two ways that covered entities may use or disclose data stripped of
patient identifiers: de-identification and the limited data set. Data that qualifies as “deidentified” is not protected by the provisions of the Rule, and therefore there are no limits on
how such data can be used and to whom it can be disclosed.
Data can qualify as “de-identified” in one of two ways. Under what is known as the statistical
method, an expert must determine that the “risk is very small that the information could be used,
alone or in combination with other reasonably available information, by an anticipated recipient
to identify an individual who is a subject of the information.” 36 The alternative method (often
referred to as the “safe harbor”) requires that the covered entity strip out a number of specific
data points, including name, address, identifying numbers, and biometric data. 37 In addition, the
covered entity releasing the data must have no actual knowledge, or reasonable basis to believe,
that the information can be easily re-identified. 38
A limited data set is information stripped of a number of the same specific data points as
required for the de-identification safe harbor. 39 Covered entities may release a limited data set
only for purposes of research, public health, and health care operations, and must execute a data
use agreement with the entity receiving the data set that sets forth the permitted uses and
disclosures of the data and that does not authorize use or disclosure in contravention of the
provisions of the Privacy Rule. 40
Some believe the current de-identification and limited data set provisions raise a number of
concerns:


The de-identification safe harbor standard is now more than five years old, and today
there is much greater access to information via public databases (a development that will
only increase in the future). It may now be easier to re-identify data, 41 and some have
called for an update to the standard, or at least an examination of whether it is as effective
as it was when first enacted. Others have questioned whether it remains good public
policy to allow data that fits the de-identification standard to remain uncovered by the
Privacy Rule.



Limited data set users must commit to not re-identifying the data, and covered entities
may only release de-identified data if it meets the standard, which is supposed to ensure a
very low risk of re-identification. But if data is re-identified, either by limited data set
recipients or by holders of de-identified data, the ability to hold those persons or entities
accountable is very limited. In the case of a limited data set, the data holder is only
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contractually obligated to the covered entity not to re-identify; a covered entity can be
held responsible for the actions of the data set recipient if 1) the entity knew of a “pattern
or practice” that constituted a material breach or a violation of the data use agreement and
2) the covered entity took no action. 42 With fully de-identified data, the information can
be shared with non-covered entities and does not require the execution of a contract –
thus there are no applicable legal prohibitions against, or penalties for, re-identification,
and such prohibitions are not required to be imposed on the data recipient via contract
(although nothing in the law prevents data holders from voluntarily imposing such a
condition).


Researchers and others, including people with rare or chronic illnesses, are concerned
that the limited data set and de-identification standards – in particular, the provisions that
require the elimination of specific data points – make the data unusable for many research
and public health purposes. They would prefer some middle ground, where the data is
stripped of those identifiers that can be easily used to re-identify (such as name, full
address, and identifying numbers) but a sufficient amount of data is retained to
accomplish the purposes for which the data is sought.

Possible Solutions
Section 13424 of ARRA requires HHS to study the current HIPAA de-identification
provisions. Section 13405 requires the Secretary to establish guidance on the “minimum
necessary” standard, which must be followed for access, use, and disclosure of personal
health information for most purposes other than treatment. Until such guidance is issued,
covered entities and their business associates are directed to use a limited data set to meet
the minimum necessary standard if doing so is “practicable.”
 HHS should seek the input of experts and the public and examine the de-identification
safe harbor to determine if it is still robust enough to provide a very low risk of reidentification, and make any appropriate revisions to the Rule. (arguably accomplished
in ARRA)
Arguments For
o Allows for a public process for re-examining the standard and helps ensure that any
changes to the standard are based on the latest science.
o The House bills each had provisions tasking HHS to examine the de-identification
standard, indicating some support for such an initiative.
Arguments Against
o Because the current standard requires data holders to have no “reasonable basis” for
believing the de-identified data could be used to identify an individual (and no actual
knowledge that the information could be re-identified), the standard is already
flexible and robust enough.
 Create more options for use of health data stripped of some individual identifiers, and
require data use agreements for all data disclosures (or at least all that do not meet the
threshold of full de-identification). (steps to accomplish taken in ARRA)
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Arguments For
o Could address concerns raised by some that the current options do not serve many
legitimate needs for data stripped of some patient identifiers.
o Could help entities use such “lesser identified” data for activities that today use fully
identifiable data (for example, many of the activities covered by health care
operations and some research).
o Helps ensure that all data recipients are held accountable.
Arguments Against
o Policymakers will face a difficult task in determining the permitted uses of various
new data set options. Could result in an environment that is either less protective or
overly stringent compared to the one that exists today.
o Requiring data use agreements for all disclosures can be a cumbersome process with
little relation to privacy protections.
o Requiring such agreements could obstruct the flow of information for public health
reporting, syndromic surveillance, bioterrorism detection, and other important public
purposes.
o Data recipients are only held accountable by the terms of their contracts.
 At a minimum, require those who obtain data stripped of patient identifiers to commit to
not re-identifying the data, except in specific circumstances (for example, notifications
about a serious public health threat or drug safety/recall notifications).
Arguments For
o Attacks the key concern with respect to the use of data stripped of patient identifiers
without the perceived risks associated with a more comprehensive re-opening of the
Rule or the de-identification standard.
Arguments Against
o The arguments above apply here. Most likely, this is possible only through a data use
agreement, and currently such agreements are not required when information is deidentified.
4. Prohibitions on Use of Personal Information for Marketing Purposes
Among consumer views on health information privacy, use of their personal information for
marketing purposes ranks among the top concerns. For example, in a 2006 survey asking
Americans about the benefits of and concerns about online health information, 77% reported
being “very concerned” about their information being used for marketing purposes. 43 The
HIPAA Privacy Rule governs a covered entity’s use of an individual’s health information for
marketing purposes, but there are no rules regarding use of health information for marketing
purposes by entities not covered by the Rule. With respect to information in personal health
records, or voluntarily shared on Internet health sites, use for marketing purposes will be
governed by whether the HIPAA Privacy Rule requirements apply, the vendor’s or site’s terms
of use or privacy policy, or what individuals may knowingly or inadvertently authorize.
The Privacy Rule prohibits covered entities from using a person’s identifiable information for
marketing purposes without his or her prior authorization. The definition of what constitutes
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“marketing” is a communication about a product or service that encourages the recipient to
purchase or use that product or service. 44 The definition includes a number of exceptions that
were crafted to allow covered entities to send important health-related communications to their
patients and enrollees without having to first obtain individual authorization. For example,
covered entities may use personal information to communicate with an individual about his or
her treatment; for case management or care coordination, or to recommend alternative therapies,
providers, or settings of care; or to describe products or services in a benefits plan or value-added
services available only to plan enrollees. 45 Individuals whose personal information is used to
make a communication exempt from the marketing rule also do not have the right to object to (or
opt out of) their personal information being used for these purposes. 46
The Privacy Rule prohibits a covered entity from selling (without authorization) protected health
information about its patients or enrollees to outside entities so that those entities can directly
market their products and services. However, such outside entities could pay the covered entity
to use protected health information to make those communications – and as long as those
communications fell under one of the exceptions to the marketing definition, authorization would
not be required. Some see this as a loophole, enabling outside entities to pay covered entities to
send targeted marketing communications that the entities could not send themselves without
express individual authorization. Others believe the rule strikes the right balance – ensuring that
protected health information remains with the covered entity (or its business associate), and
allowing beneficial communications to be sent to patients and enrollees without having to ask
first for patient authorization (which under the Privacy Rule must be fairly detailed).
The polling data is clear that individuals feel strongly about the use of their information without
their consent for marketing purposes. There does not appear to be consensus, however, on
whether the marketing provisions in the Privacy Rule need to be revised in order to build trust in
e-health systems. Some claim that direct marketing to individuals helps drive up the cost of
care; others point to communications that can help lower costs and ensure individuals get
appropriate care (such as communications to facilitate medication adherence, or about lower-cost
therapeutic alternatives or free or low-cost prevention services).
Policymakers have not yet begun to address concerns about the use of personal health
information in PHRs and on Internet sites for marketing purposes.
Possible Solutions
Section 13406 of ARRA revises the HIPAA marketing rule to require prior authorization
when an individual’s protected health information will be used to make a communication
that is paid for (directly or indirectly) by an outside entity. Exceptions include:
communications about drugs or biologics that are currently prescribed for, or
administered to, an individual - as long as the payment from the outside entity is
reasonable in amount. The provision also makes an exception for remuneration that
constitutes payment for treatment of an individual. Other related ARRA provisions
include: Section 13406, requiring covered entities to allow individuals to opt-out of
receiving fundraising communications; and Section 13405, prohibiting the direct or
indirect receipt of remuneration in exchange for an individual’s protected health
information.
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 Strengthen HIPAA rules requiring prior authorization for use of personal information for
marketing by covered entities and establish rules for use of information for marketing
purposes by non-covered entities. (at least partially addressed in ARRA)
Arguments For
o Attacks a key concern of the public with respect to uses of their health information.
Could be structured in a way that permits some targeted communication with patients
for legitimate health purposes but without creating loopholes that end up permitting
the use of personal information for the purpose of marketing a broad range of healthrelated products and services.
o Could be accomplished by regulatory change with respect to marketing by covered
entities and their business associates.
Arguments Against
o Would require legislation for non-covered entities.
o Drawing the line between “good marketing” – using individuals’ information to send
communications that clearly advance their health or health care – and “commercial
marketing” – where the communication is arguably related to health but where the
benefit to the individual is less clear or is secondary to the commercial interests of the
entity sponsoring the communication – can be difficult. There also are stakeholders
either firmly committed to preserving the status quo or concerned that any changes
could have unintended consequences for patient health or health care business
operations.
o There could be negative health consequences for individuals (e.g., no or less
information about available benefits, treatment alternatives, etc.).
 Increase compliance with the Privacy Rule’s current provisions by issuing additional
guidance about the types of communications that are or are not “marketing.”
Arguments For
o Does not require amendment to the Rule (although could be done in conjunction with
amending the Rule to enhance understanding of the Rule’s provisions and improve
compliance).
o Could result in more communications, which today are allowable under different
interpretations of the marketing exemptions, being deemed to be “marketing” and
therefore requiring prior authorization.
o Would continue to allow essential communications to individuals that directly impact
their health, care, and outcomes.
Arguments Against
o Depending on the content of the guidance, could inadvertently bless more marketing
uses without patient authorization than occur today.
o Because it preserves the perceived inadequacies in the current Rule, unclear how well
such an initiative would build consumer trust.
 Leave Rule as is for current covered entities but set more stringent rules for use of
information for marketing purposes by health information exchanges, and adopt rules
governing marketing uses by PHRs and Internet health sites.
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Arguments For
o Avoids more difficult re-negotiation of the Rule for current actors and instead targets
new challenges raised by e-health.
o Challenge of finding a viable business model for electronic exchange networks – and
potentially PHRs – makes the information held in or exchanged through these
vehicles a potentially attractive target for marketers, strengthening the case for
targeting this area for strong regulation.
Arguments Against
o Does not address what some perceive to be deficiencies in the Rule today (for
example, the use of protected health information without prior patient authorization
by covered entities to send communications that are paid for by an outside company
and that encourage the patient to use that company’s goods and services).
o Depending on the terms of the specific rule, could potentially cut off a source of
operating revenue for these exchanges.
 Change Rule from the current “opt-in (but with exceptions)” approach to instead allow
individuals to opt-out of receiving all marketing communications, including those that
today are exempt from the definition of marketing. (at least partially addressed in
ARRA)
Arguments For
o Could be easier to implement without the need to determine which communications
are “good” (and thus should be permitted without authorization) and which should
first require explicit patient permission.
o Assumes patients want to receive these communications but empowers patients to
stop them if they object.
o In a variation, could also retain the authorization requirement for communications
that qualify under the current marketing definition (thus, permitting opt-out for those
communications that are currently exempt from the definition but that consumers
could still view as marketing).
Arguments Against
o Places burden on individual to police how their information is and isn’t used – clear
boundaries on use of information provide more reliable protections for privacy.
o Arguably less protective than current rule, which requires authorization to use
information for marketing with some exceptions (unless authorization requirement is
retained for those uses that currently qualify as marketing).
o Stifles needed information for individuals and could result in negative health
outcomes.
 Leave current Rule as is; allow non-HIPAA covered entities to compete on the basis of
their policies with respect to use of information for marketing purposes (HIPAA-covered
entities could also voluntarily implement more stringent controls on uses of information
for marketing purposes, and compete on that basis).
Arguments For
o Does not require changes to current law.
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o Could lead to more privacy-protective environment if robust “privacy competition”
emerges.
Arguments Against
o Few individuals know the extent to which their information is used to market or make
health-related communications to them. Thus, they may be unlikely to inquire or
make decisions based on use of their information for these purposes. This may be
particularly true in a health care context, where choice of care provider involves a
myriad of important variables – and where many individuals do not have choices (or a
wide range of choices) with respect to their sources of care.
o Unless the policy is clearly articulated, explanations of uses of information in a
privacy policy may not be clear. A clear policy could explicitly state, in part: “we do
not use your information to recommend products or services to you under any
circumstances”.
5. Other Areas where HIPAA Could be Strengthened
As personal health information is accessed and exchanged more easily in the new electronic
environment, HIPAA policies regarding access to, and use and disclosure of, health information
may be inadequate and contribute to a lack of public trust in health IT and health information
exchange. Some of these issues are new ones raised by the new e-health environment, while
others were initially raised during the HIPAA regulatory debates and may or may not be
exacerbated by the new information sharing models. In the past year policymakers have
considered addressing the following:


Uncertainty regarding how to apply the “minimum necessary” standard. Under the
Privacy Rule, access to, and uses and disclosures of, personal health information must be
limited to the minimum necessary to accomplish the legitimate purpose for accessing the
information, except with respect to treatment. 47 This standard was intended to be flexible
in order to accommodate a broad range of circumstances, but the lack of clear boundaries
has resulted in a great deal of confusion about how to comply. 48 Some believe further
guidance on the minimum necessary standard could help resolve this uncertainty. (As
noted on page 16, ARRA requires the Secretary to issue guidance on the minimum
necessary standard and strongly encourages the use of a limited data set.)



Perception among some privacy and patient advocates that “health care operations”
permits too much sharing of personal health information. Under the Privacy Rule,
“health care operations” is specifically defined. However, a number of the descriptions
are very broad and permit use and disclosure of personal health information for functions
that could be achieved without patient identifiers or could be done only with the consent
or authorization of the patient. For example, health care operations include activities
such as: conducting quality assessment and improvement activities; reviewing the
competence or qualifications of health care professionals; underwriting and premium
rating; auditing; and business management and general administrative activities - such as
due diligence related to a merger, customer service functions, and fundraising for the
benefit of the covered entity (see Appendix B for a complete list). The Privacy Rule also
permits covered entities to share health information with another covered entity for the
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purpose of the recipient entities’ health care operations, as long as both entities have a
relationship with the patient. 49


The PRO(TECH)T Act of 2008 would have required patient consent (not authorization)
for health care operations uses. A number of stakeholders expressed concern that this
provision would significantly stifle uses of health care information for important
purposes like public health and quality measurement; others noted that because treatment
and coverage could be conditioned on patients giving their consent to health care
operations uses, it would provide little meaningful privacy protection. The Health-e
Technology Act of 2008 took a different approach, tasking HHS to examine the
definition of health care operations and determine which functions could be performed
with de-identified data and which should require prior authorization.



Uncertainty regarding which Privacy Rule provisions should apply to health information
exchanges. As noted above, the Privacy Rule historically has not applied to health
information exchanges (for example, RHIOs, HIEs, and ePrescribing Gateways), except
those that may qualify as healthcare clearinghouses. Many of these entities have
executed business associate agreements with the covered entities that participate in the
exchange. However, it is not clear that all have done so, which has prompted some to
call for a requirement that these exchanges either be covered entities or enter into
business associate agreements (depending on their structure and function). (As noted
above, ARRA clarifies that some of these entities must enter into business associate
agreements.)
But securing coverage under HIPAA, either directly or as a business associate, only
addresses part of the question. Once covered, policymakers need to determine the data
access, use, and disclosure rules that will apply to these new entities. For example,
should a person’s identifiable health information be used in these exchanges only for
treatment of the individual, or can it be accessed to treat another individual? Under the
Privacy Rule today, covered entities can use one patient’s identifiable information for
treating another patient. 50 This permissive use raises privacy concerns, particularly when
data on any patient can be accessed across multiple institutions and providers
participating in a network. Should exchanges be accessible for payment purposes, or to
accomplish health care operations? Should exchanges exist only to facilitate the health
care activities of the covered entities participating in the exchange, or should the
exchange itself be permitted to use data for its own purposes? What if some of the
entities providing support for and participating in the exchange are not themselves
covered by HIPAA? In the absence of clear rules, health exchanges are working out the
rules of the road on their own, often with multi-stakeholder involvement. There has been
no objective study of the results to date.



Confusion regarding whether quality improvement uses of identifiable health information
is a health care operation (not requiring patient consent) or research, which requires
authorization except in certain circumstances. As noted multiple times throughout this
paper, health reform proposals are looking to health IT as the linchpin for providing the
data that will help improve quality of care. The Privacy Rule permits the use of
identifiable health information without patient consent for “quality assessment and
improvement activities, including outcomes evaluation and development of clinical
guidelines” – as long as “obtaining generalizable knowledge is not the primary purpose
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of any studies resulting from those activities.” 51 The Privacy Rule also permits the use of
identifiable information without patient consent for population-based activities relating to
improving health or reducing health care costs, and protocol development. 52 Separate
provisions of the Privacy Rule permit covered entities to use and disclose identifiable
information for research purposes; such research requires specific authorization from the
patient unless an IRB or Privacy Board waives the requirement based on the low risk to
patient privacy. 53 (As noted above, use of de-identified data or a limited data set for
research purposes is also permitted and in most cases will not require prior patient
authorization.) Confusion about which provision applies to what types of quality
improvement activities could hinder efforts to implement more robust measurement and
other quality improvement efforts. (Some have expressed concerns about the possible
negative impact of ARRA’s prohibition (13405) on the receipt of remuneration for
protected health information on uses of data for research and public health.)


Inability to meaningfully restrict access to and disclosure of health information. Under
the Privacy Rule, individuals have a right to request a restriction on the use and
disclosure of their health information – but covered entities are neither required to
comply with the request, nor provide a reason for noncompliance. 54 If a covered entity
grants the request, however, it must comply. Some have advocated for granting a
stronger right to restrict access to information, particularly with respect to information
that is exchanged electronically through the “National Health Information Network”
(NHIN). For example, NCVHS has recommended allowing people to choose whether or
not their information is included in the NHIN, and to be able to restrict network access to
data in certain sensitive categories. 55 In its recommendation regarding the right to restrict
access to sensitive information, NCVHS acknowledged that few individuals would likely
make such a request; but noted that individuals would strongly value the right and ability
to do so. 56 (Section 13405 of ARRA gives individuals a right to request a restriction
on disclosures to health plans for payment and health care operations when they
pay for their care out-of-pocket in full).
Technology may improve the ability for health data holders to segregate sensitive data
and comply with a patient request to restrict data access. However, if compliance with
such a restriction is mandatory, providers, plans and other health data holders will likely
seek to be held harmless for inadvertent access and disclosure of information in
contravention of a patient’s requested restriction, as long as the holders used reasonable
efforts to comply. NCVHS also recognized that providers should be notified if a patient
has decided to sequester or restrict access to information in a sensitive category, but they
left for further discussion how this notification would take place. 57 Further, a
requirement that applies only to those with electronic records risks creating disincentives
for providers and others to move from paper to electronic systems.



Uncertainty over patients’ rights to access their records electronically, or receive an
electronic copy. The effort to engage more individuals in their health care through the
use of consumer-facing electronic tools such as PHRs will not be successful if individuals
cannot easily and promptly obtain electronic access to, or electronic copies of, their
health records. Under the Privacy Rule, patients have the right to access, and obtain a
copy of, their health information in the form or format requested, “if it is readily
producible in that form or format.” 58 Some believe that this language already obligates
providers and plans with electronic health records to provide an electronic copy of the
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record. Anecdotal reports, however, suggest that providers are not clear on their
obligations and that patients have had difficulty obtaining copies of their health records in
electronic format, in part because not all electronic health record applications facilitate
the easy production of electronic copies. In general, difficulty in obtaining a copy of
one’s record, even in paper format, is the one of the top five HIPAA complaints
investigated by OCR. 59 Also, some believe that the timeframe for responding to a
records request – which is at least 30 days under the current Rule 60 – should be shortened
when those records are kept electronically, and that the cost to consumers of obtaining an
electronic copy should be free or set at a level more commensurate with the costs of
making electronic an electronic copy available. Under the current Rule, such costs are
required to be “reasonable” and “cost-based”; 61 however, most states set limits on
copying charges for medical records, which range from free (Kentucky) to $37.00 for up
to the first 10 pages of a hospital record (Texas). 62 (Section 13405 of ARRA requires
covered entities using “electronic health records” (a defined term in ARRA) to
provide individuals with an electronic copy. Any fee charged for this electronic
copy cannot exceed the entity’s labor costs in responding to the request. Individuals
can have their electronic copy transmitted to another person or entity, as long as
their choice is “clear, conspicuous, and specific”.)


Controversy over the appropriate role for patient consent or authorization. The Privacy
Rule permits the gathering and sharing of information for a range of purposes without the
need to first obtain the patient’s consent. For uses and disclosures not specifically
permitted under the Privacy Rule, a patient’s specific written authorization is required.
An earlier version of the Rule would have required patient consent for treatment,
payment, and health care operations; but providers and plans could have conditioned
treatment or coverage on obtaining patient consent for these routine uses of their
information. 63 However, this version was harshly criticized by the health care industry,
who argued that the requirements would hinder the delivery of treatment, the processing
of payments, and other routine activities by requiring consent to be obtained over and
over again. 64 In response, HHS amended this version in 2002 before it went into effect
and replaced it with the structure that is in place today: permissive use of information for
certain routine health purposes: authorization required for uses and disclosures not
specifically enumerated in the Rule; and plans and providers may not condition providing
coverage or treatment on the patient’s execution of such an authorization. 65 A number of
privacy advocates harshly criticized the amendment, and some continue to call for
restoration of the earlier version requiring consent for nearly all uses and disclosures of
health information. 66 Others note that such consent could not possibly be voluntary, and
that overreliance on consent unfairly shifts the burden for protecting privacy to
individuals and not to the organizations holding the data. 67 Some entities would not
likely support such a proposal, as requiring individual consent for routine health care
functions could stifle necessary payment and other important processes.
Also relevant is whether there should be an enhanced role for patient choice with respect
to whether or not health information is included in an electronic exchange network.
Exchange networks across the country are considering, and some have begun to
implement, consent policies that require people to opt-in to, or allow them to opt-out of,
sharing their health information through an exchange network either in whole or in part
(such as by provider or by type of information). 68 In general, those networks must
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balance the extent to which providing consumers with meaningful choice about having
their personal information exchanged in a local, state, or national network increases
patient trust and values individual autonomy against the consequences both for
individuals and for the system of having potentially incomplete data available for
treatment decisions and public health. As noted above, NCVHS has recommended that
individuals at least have the right to opt-out of information sharing through the NHIN. 69
Additionally, the Markle Foundation’s Common Framework released in 2006 Resources for Implementing Private and Secure Health Information Exchanges,
recommends giving patients control by allowing them to create a second or third identity
for records they want to keep out of networked electronic records exchanges. 70 Although
a number of sources have begun informally tracking the policies of various exchanges
throughout the country, there has been no systematic study of the impact of the various
policy models being adopted.
Possible Solutions
 HHS could issue more guidance on how to comply with the Privacy Rule. (As noted on
page 16, ARRA directs the Secretary to issue guidance on the minimum necessary
standard.)
Arguments For
o A common sense and prompt way to address a number of the above issues, including:
confusion
regarding
the
minimum
necessary
rule;
which
quality
measurement/improvement activities are permitted without consent as health care
operations and which constitute research and require authorization absent a waiver;
and the obligation of covered entities to provide individuals with electronic copies of
their health records.
o Could be combined with a new system whereby stakeholders, without penalty, can
ask the Office of Civil Rights (OCR) to publicly opine on whether certain proposed
health information uses or disclosures are in compliance with the Rule.
Arguments Against
o OCR is already under-resourced, and without a resource increase may not be able to
issue guidance promptly and on as broad a range of topics as desirable. Also
probably not possible without more resources to institute any new program to
publicly issue specific responses to stakeholder questions.
o Guidance alone may not be sufficient to address all of the concerns raised above.
 HHS could examine the health care operations definition and issue new regulations that
limit the use of identifiable data without consent. The regulations could require more of
the current health care operations to be done with data stripped of some patient
identifiers, or could potentially require authorization for some uses that today are
permitted without consent. Another possible option is for HHS to issue guidance on the
“minimum necessary” standard that encompasses both the extent of data accessed, as
well as the extent of “identifiability” of the data, for health care operations purposes.
(partially accomplished in ARRA)
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Arguments For
o Addresses directly one of the biggest concerns that privacy advocates have with the
Privacy Rule.
o Outcome could enhance privacy while still allowing the use of data for a range of
operational purposes.
Arguments Against
o Health care industry has five years of experience working with HIPAA and will be
concerned about not being permitted to use identifiable data for the same broad range
of purposes as is permitted today. A possible compromise could be to allow use of
identifiable data only for an entity’s own health care operations, whether performed
by the entity itself or a business associate on its behalf. However, this compromise
may not be feasible in a more interconnected health system.
o Because of the significant interests involved, could be difficult to achieve, even in a
regulatory context.
o Requiring the use of data stripped of patient identifiers for routine operations could
increase health care costs. Additionally, as many health care operations are closely
linked to treatment and payment functions, delays may result in information sharing
for these purposes as well as for health care operations that help facilitate quality
improvement efforts.
o Could result in broad requirements that negatively impact essential health care
operations such as quality improvement programs.
 HHS could issue new regulations regarding the terms of access to health information
exchanges, including defining minimum standards for consumer choice.
Arguments For
o For states currently establishing exchanges, a clear set of baseline rules could clarify
the difficulty of trying to achieve a mutual agreement among stakeholders.
o Public trust will be enhanced if these entities are subject to enforceable rules about
how they can and cannot use health information.
Arguments Against
o It is too early to establish rules to govern the behavior of these exchanges. Premature
regulation may stifle local variation and innovation. (Note that, in the alternative,
exchanges could at least be required to adopt policies that are consistent with a health
fair information practices models such as the Markle Common Framework).
o Viable business models for long-term operation of these exchanges have yet to be
established and regulating too stringently or early in this space could jeopardize their
implementation.
 Filling gaps in HIPAA and establishing privacy protections that go beyond the HIPAA
floor could occur through voluntary adherence to best practices or certification.
Arguments For
o Such an approach is consistent with the HIPAA model, which provides a baseline
floor of standards and allows for states to adopt more stringent laws and for the
private sector to voluntarily promote and adopt more stringent privacy protections.
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o Likely easier to accomplish than regulatory or legislative change.
o May be more cost-effective than imposing through a top-down regulatory approach.
Arguments Against
o Patients care about their health information privacy, but often don’t make health care
decisions based on an institution’s privacy policies, as noted above. There will be
few (if any) market incentives for enhancing privacy, thus there is a strong role for
public policy to play.
o Voluntary adoption of best practices and certification is less likely to achieve broadbased adoption of stronger privacy protection.
o Certification, which typically occurs only in time intervals, may be inappropriate for
ensuring adequate protections for privacy. For example, a health IT product may be
certified to include certain functionalities that are privacy-enhancing, such as rolebased access and audit trails. But if these functions are not being consistently used,
or if the entity is not monitoring compliance (or being actively monitored for
compliance), certification does little to enhance privacy protection.
C. State Law Variation
As noted above, because HIPAA was structured to provide a floor of protections, state laws
providing more stringent protections for health information are expressly preserved. Movement
towards an interconnected national health information network raises concerns that the
multiplicity of state privacy laws will create an obstacle to the nationwide electronic exchange of
health information or the exchange of information regionally across state lines. Others have
noted the difficulty in determining a particular state’s health privacy laws, as they are often a
combination of statute, regulation and guidance, customary practice, and common law.
Possible Solutions
 Establish a federal health privacy law that preempts all state health privacy laws. A
possible alternative is to set a single federal standard that preempts existing state law (i.e.,
“wipes the slate clean”), but allow states to pass new laws establishing stronger privacy
provisions (perhaps within a certain window of time).
Arguments For
o Should eliminate confusion and create a more consistent policy environment for
privacy and nationwide electronic health information exchange.
o Makes more sense in a health care arena increasingly dominated by multi-state
players.
o The alternative approach preserves the ability for states to re-enact those privacy
provisions they deem to be most important while making it easier for cross-state
actors to understand and comply with relevant laws (because there will likely be
fewer of them).

Arguments Against
o Congress intended the HIPAA Privacy Rule to provide a floor of protections – not a
ceiling. Thus, if the single national standard is the set of current HIPAA rules, some
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stakeholders will fight any attempts to decrease privacy protections for individuals
living in states with laws that are currently stronger than HIPAA.
o The more stringent state laws typically cover more sensitive health information, such
as mental health, sexually transmitted diseases, or HIV/AIDS. Efforts to eliminate
these protections will be opposed by their constituencies and could erode public trust.
o Another alternative is to create a national standard that is greater than HIPAA
(perhaps using the states with the most expansive privacy protections as model) – but
this may be opposed by industry stakeholders, particularly those whose business
operations are primarily in states with less stringent privacy laws.
o Many of the state protections for health data were enacted as part of state public
health reporting statutes – so eliminating the protections could inadvertently
jeopardize the reporting provisions.
 Status quo - federal standards are a floor, with states able to adopt more protective
measures. Arguments for and against this option are the reverse of those for the above
option.
D. Improving Understanding of and Compliance with HIPAA Protections
As noted above in the introduction, confusion about the Privacy Rule persists, which often
results in overly conservative interpretations of the Rule and a failure to share health information
even for legitimate purposes. Some attribute this confusion to a lack of education about the
substance of the Rule; others believe the Rule is too complex to be effective. In addition,
privacy advocates express concerns about what they perceive to be a lack of aggressive
enforcement of HIPAA. Others are concerned about oversight and enforcement over entities
handling personal health information that are not covered by HIPAA. This section of the paper
discusses these concerns in more detail.
1. Complexity of the Rule/Lack of Understanding
Possible Solutions
Section 13403 of ARRA requires HHS to develop and maintain a “multi-faceted national
education initiative” to educate individuals on the uses of their health information and
their privacy rights.
 Revise the Privacy Rule to make it less complex. For example, rely more on broadly
worded fair information practices and principles and address detailed circumstances
through guidance, model policies, etc.
Arguments For
o Increases the likelihood that patients and covered entities will understand their rights
and obligations.
o Provides more opportunities for innovative approaches to protecting privacy.
Arguments Against
o Industry has had five years to become accustomed to current law. Notwithstanding
that some confusion persists, isn’t it more disruptive to start over?

O’NEILL INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL AND GLOBAL HEALTH LAW
GEORGETOWN LAW | 600 NEW JERSEY AVENUE NW | WASHINGTON, DC 20001
www.oneillinstitute.org
28

o Arguably will not result in a consistent set of baseline rules, and consumers will have
to read and understand an entity’s policies in order to get a clear picture of how well
their health information is protected.
o Alternative is to task HHS with identifying those areas of the Rule that have been the
largest sources of confusion and target those for simplification.
 Provide more guidance and better education on the requirements of the Rule to entities
covered by it.
Arguments For
o More guidance and extensive education on the requirements of the Rules could help
clear up any remaining areas of confusion.
Arguments Against
o There may not be resources at OCR to support an effective education program. Is
OCR the ideal entity to conduct this education, or are there better alternatives (such as
an OCR partnership with health industry trade associations)?
o Further, who would set the standards for such programs and is it possible to generate
any measurable outcomes from them?
 Improve consumer education on HIPAA rights by requiring entities to provide a one-page
summary privacy notice, written in plain English at average reading levels. This could be
provided in addition to the more detailed notice; HHS could create models. (partially
accomplished in ARRA)
Arguments For
o Ensures consumers are provided with a more digestible summary of the most
important aspects of the Rule.
o The summary would be provided in addition to the more detailed notice, which would
still be provided for patients who want to read more details.
o Is consistent with the “layered notice” approach recommended by privacy advocates.
o If models are developed and disseminated by HHS, notices will be more consistent.
This also helps promote greater understanding of the law.
Arguments Against
o HHS has insufficient resources to accomplish this.
o It is already burdensome for covered entities to provide, and for patients to read, the
extensive HIPAA privacy notice that is already required under the law – why should
the response be to provide consumers with yet another summary of their rights?
o Consumers may not welcome yet another notice about their privacy rights.
2. Compliance with the Rule and Enforcement
When Congress enacted HIPAA in 1996, it included civil and criminal penalties for failure to
comply with the statute, and these penalties applied to the subsequent privacy and security rules
implemented years later. But whether the HIPAA rules are being adequately enforced is the
subject of some debate among policymakers and stakeholders.
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OCR has not levied a single penalty against a HIPAA-covered entity in the nearly five years
since the rules were implemented, even though that office has found numerous violations of the
rules. 71 The Justice Department (DOJ) has levied some penalties under the criminal provisions
of the statute, but a 2005 opinion from DOJ’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) expressly limits
the application of the criminal provisions to covered entities and not to individuals working
within or on behalf of those covered entities (except in cases where an individual’s criminal
behavior was actually sanctioned by the covered entity). 72 Although DOJ has prosecuted
individuals for criminal HIPAA violations in at least two instances subsequent to the OLC
opinion, some have argued that its release has had a chilling effect on HIPAA criminal
enforcement. 73
Congress tasked HHS and DOJ with enforcing HIPAA: HHS for civil enforcement and DOJ for
criminal enforcement. Within HHS, OCR enforces the Privacy Rule, and the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) enforces the Security Rule. State authorities may be
able to enforce HIPAA if their state statutes authorize them to enforce federal consumer
protection laws. Otherwise, state authorities can only enforce state health privacy laws.
Some privacy advocates believe that the failure of HHS to aggressively pursue civil monetary
penalties sends a message to entities that they need not devote significant resources to
compliance with the rules. They also argue that, without strong enforcement, even the strongest
privacy and security protections are but an empty promise for patients. Privacy advocates also
are concerned about HIPAA’s failure to include a private right of action, which leaves
consumers dependent on the federal government and without a way to be made whole for any
harm due to HIPAA noncompliance.
Covered entities repeatedly express concern about protecting patient privacy and cite the
potential irreversible damage to their reputations if patients lose confidence in their ability to
protect personal health information. The covered entities believe this provides a powerful
incentive for them to comply with the law. They argue that strengthening HIPAA’s enforcement
provisions would have the unintended consequence of stifling appropriate health information
sharing, because entities could over interpret the Rule in an effort to ensure that they are not
using or disclosing information in violation of the Rule or in contravention of a patient’s right.
They are worried that providing patients with a private right of action would have the same
consequence and is more likely to profit attorneys than to provide a fair way of promptly
compensating patients for any harm that results from failure of a covered entity to comply with
HIPAA. In addition, some believe that an enforcement approach that seeks voluntary
compliance from covered entities is a more effective method for actually achieving compliance
with the requirements.
As discussed above in this paper, privacy advocates have also been concerned about the federal
government’s lack of authority before the passage of ARRA to hold business associates
accountable for failure to comply with HIPAA. Instead, business associates could only be held
accountable to the covered entities with which they contract for complying with the contract
terms and any applicable HIPAA rules. OCR could only hold covered entities responsible for
the actions of their business associates if an entity knew of a “pattern of activity or practice of the
business associated that constituted a material breach or violation” of its contract and the entity
did nothing to cure the breach or terminate the contract. 74 Of interest, if the covered entity
decided that terminating the contract was “not feasible,” the entity was required to report the
problem to the Secretary. 75 However, HIPAA did not give the Secretary any further authority to
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enforce the statute and regulations against the business associate or to hold the covered entity
responsible for the violation. Entities serving in the role as business associates argue that
contractual liability to the covered entity is sufficient to ensure enforcement of applicable
HIPAA rules, as the business associate’s business and public reputation is at stake if there is a
failure to comply.
Some believe the enforcement provisions of the HIPAA statute are poorly worded and partly to
blame for the current enforcement environment, while others attribute the Bush Administration’s
discretion with respect to enforcement priorities and a lack of sufficient enforcement resources as
more significant factors. On the other hand, some industry stakeholders believe that the
enforcement provisions in the statute and regulations provide sufficient and clear legal authority
for enforcement of the rules, and that the combination of the law and non-legal penalties for
failure to comply with HIPAA provides sufficient protection for consumers.
For entities not covered by HIPAA, enforcement depends on the particular health privacy law
that applies. For example, the FTC can use its unfair and deceptive trade practices authority to
penalize those companies that fail to abide by their privacy policies with respect to the personal
health information they collect, manage, or store. Similarly, for those personal health record
vendors subject to the Electronic Communications Protection Act, the Justice Department can
impose criminal fines and penalties against entities that release personal health information
without the individual record holder’s authorization. Such entities may also be subject to state
law claims.
Possible Solutions
ARRA contains a number of provisions addressing the enforcement issues raised above:
 Section 13401 makes business associates directly accountable to authorities for
complying with applicable HIPAA regulations.
 Section 13409 clarifies that HIPAA criminal penalties can be enforced against
individuals.
 Section 13410 clarifies that HHS can pursue a HIPAA violation civilly when
criminal penalties could apply but DOJ declines to prosecute.
 Section 13410 also requires HHS to impose civil monetary penalties in cases of
willful neglect of HIPAA rules (and requires the Secretary to formally investigate
any complaint where the facts indicate a possible violation due to willful neglect).
 Section 13410 increases the civil monetary penalties for HIPAA violations.
 Section 13410 authorizes State Attorneys General to enforce HIPAA.
 Section 13411 requires the Secretary to conduct periodic audits for compliance with
HIPAA regulations.
 Section 13410 further requires that civil penalties or monetary settlements for
HIPAA violations be transferred to HHS to be used for enforcement purposes. In
addition, GAO is required to propose a methodology for providing individuals
harmed by HIPAA violations with a percentage of any penalties or monetary
settlements collected; the Secretary is required to implement such a methodology
within three years of ARRA enactment.
 Section 13424 requires HHS to submit an annual report to Congress on
enforcement.
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 Ensure that there is an enforcement regime to address entities not covered by HIPAA that
are handling personal health information. (at least partially addressed in ARRA)
Arguments For
o Enforcement is a critical part of fair information practices. Ensuring that non-HIPAA
entities are subject to enforcement of either currently applicable standards or any new
standards adopted by Congress and/or the new Administration should be a focus in
2009.
Arguments Against
o Few will argue that some enforcement structure is needed to build public trust in
these new health information exchange tools. It may be harder to agree on the details:
what the standards are, who enforces, whether the penalty structure is appropriate,
etc.
 Amend the HIPAA statutory enforcement provisions to clarify current enforcement
authority. The amendments could require the Secretary to formally investigate and
impose civil monetary penalties in cases of willful neglect of the HIPAA rules. Or, the
provision could clearly state that the Secretary can pursue civil actions in cases where a
criminal violation may have occurred but the Justice Department decides not to pursue
the case. Finally, an amendment could correct the Office of Legal Counsel’s
interpretation of HIPAA with respect to the ability to pursue individuals who violate
HIPAA’s criminal provisions. (addressed in ARRA)
Arguments For
o Arguably this is just a clarification of current enforcement authority, so it may not be
as controversial (note that provisions accomplishing the above were part of the
Health-e Information Technology Act of 2008).
Arguments Against
o There is already sufficient statutory and regulatory authority to enforce HIPAA.
o Covered entities may oppose any effort to clarify statutory enforcement authority,
viewing it as opening the door to more aggressive enforcement.
 Amend HIPAA to allow the Secretary of HHS to directly enforce the HIPAA regulations
against business associates. (addressed in ARRA)
Arguments For
o Closes an enforcement loophole and allows the federal government to directly hold
business associates accountable for complying with HIPAA (provisions to
accomplish this were in the House bills).
o Brings federal health privacy law closer to a data stewardship model (i.e., all entities
that handle personal health information have to comply with baseline standards and
can be held legally accountable).
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Arguments Against
o Will be vigorously opposed by entities who frequently act as business associates to
covered entities. Could cause these entities to be unwilling to contract with health
care entities out of fear of increased penalties. If these entities cease providing
services, the cost of health care products and services could be affected.
o As an alternative, policymakers could make covered entities responsible for the
actions of their business associates, which will generate vigorous opposition from
covered entities who do not want to be legally responsible for behavior not in their
control.
 Amend HIPAA to provide a private right of action for individuals to seek redress for
HIPAA violations. (at least partially addressed in ARRA)
Arguments For
o Patients will not have to depend on the government’s taking action when their privacy
rights have been violated.
o Provides patients with a way to directly seek redress for privacy violations.
Arguments Against
o Will generate aggressive opposition, including from those promoting general tort
reform. A possible alternative is to re-direct some or all of the civil monetary and
criminal penalties collected to individuals whose privacy is violated. Provisions to
eventually establish a method for distributing a percentage of civil monetary penalties
to individuals harmed by HIPAA violations were included in the Health-e
Information Technology Act of 2008.)
o Not clear that allowing individuals to sue to seek redress for privacy violations is the
most effective or efficient way to improve enforcement of privacy protections or get
individuals compensation for harm due to a HIPAA violation.
o Individuals are likely to be frustrated with such a cumbersome process. Litigation is
time-consuming and expensive. Often, individuals are concerned with exercising
their privacy rights under HIPAA (e.g., access, amendment) and litigation is neither
an efficient nor cost-effective way to provide immediate results or access.
o Increased costs from litigation expenses can affect overall health care costs for
consumers.
 Expressly authorize state authorities to also enforce the federal HIPAA rules. (addressed
in ARRA)
Arguments For
o There is precedent for doing this (see CAN-SPAM, which authorizes state attorneys
general to enforce federal anti-spam provisions 76 ).
o Devotes more resources to enforcement without a change to the current provisions.
Arguments Against
o Requires federal legislation to clearly authorize authorities in all states to enforce
HIPAA.
o Likely controversial, as covered entities may be concerned about overly zealous state
authorities and the possibility that legitimate data sharing will be thwarted because
entities will be more cautious. Provisions were included in the as-introduced version
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of Health-e Information Technology Act of 2008, but attempts to add such a
provision to the PRO(TECH)T Act were unsuccessful because the provision did not
have the support of all of the bill’s primary co-sponsors.
o Potentially opens up the Privacy Rule to 50 different state interpretations.
o Presents an opportunity for duplicate fines for the same acts/offenses.
o Unclear whether this would result in better enforcement, as state authorities cannot be
compelled to enforce federal law. As a result, only those state authorities with a
strong desire to enforce HIPAA will likely take advantage of the provision.
 Status quo with respect to HIPAA enforcement provisions.
Arguments For
o There is no objective evidence that the current enforcement provisions are flawed.
DOJ has pursued a handful of criminal violations, notwithstanding the OLC memo.
o The new Administration should and will set its own enforcement policies with respect
to criminal and civil HIPAA violations.
o Covered entities will vigorously enforce the terms of their business associate
contracts because it is in their best interests to do so, and business associates will use
their best efforts to comply because it makes good business sense to do so.
Arguments Against
o Such an approach ignores the flaws in the statute, and the potential that the Obama
Administration will have the same perceived difficulty as the Bush Administration in
navigating them.
o Such an approach fails to address the frustration felt by consumers about the
perceived lack of enforcement of the law.
o Such an approach leaves business associates with a free pass, creating an unlevel
playing field.
Conclusion
Many believe more efficient sharing of accurate health information is a critical factor in
improving health care quality for individual patients and for the nation as a whole. Health
information technology provides the necessary infrastructure for creating the information-rich
health care system we seek – but building the infrastructure is not enough. Consumers,
providers, health plans, and other health system stakeholders will be reluctant to put information
in the system if they don’t trust that it will be protected. Privacy and security protections are
essential to building this foundation of trust and allowing us to reap the benefits that health IT
can provide.
For the most part, there is consensus that efforts to facilitate widespread adoption and use of
health information technology must move forward with appropriate protections for privacy and
security. However, achieving consensus on the details of what privacy and security measures
need to be put in place continues to be a challenge. The enactment of ARRA represents a new
generation of health privacy – but implementation challenges remain to be addressed.
The new Administration and new Congress present us with new opportunities to break the
privacy “gridlock.” Notwithstanding other critical national issues that need urgent attention, we
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have never had a better opportunity to pursue reform of our health care system, facilitated by
interoperable health IT with protections for privacy and security. Consistent with the goal of the
Legal Solutions in Health Reform Project, this paper presents a range of possible solutions to
privacy concerns that have been raised by some policymakers and stakeholders, along a few of
the likely arguments for and against each. Hopefully, it will be a catalyst for continuing to make
progress on this difficult issue.
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APPENDIX A – List of Possible Solutions by Issue Category (issues addressed at least in
part by ARRA are so designated)
Who is Covered - Do we extend the privacy rules under the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA) to all entities that now handle health information, or create new
legal standards for entities not currently covered?
 Amend HIPAA to create new categories of covered entities and require OCR to
promulgate new privacy regulations to cover the activities of these new entities.
 Clarify business associate agreements. Require (or encourage) HHS to issue new
regulations or strengthen current guidance to ensure that entities receiving protected
health information from a covered entity – such as exchanges or PHRs that offered by
that entity– must enter into a business associate agreement or at least be contractually
bound to safeguard the information and comply with HIPAA. (ARRA)
 Require any entity that holds or manages protected health information to adopt policies
consistent with fair information practices, which is the model typically relied on to
establish appropriate policies for handling personal information.
 Keep the law in its current state but encourage the adoption of good privacy practices
through voluntary business agreements and/or certification.
What is Covered - What protections need to be in place? For example, do we rely on current
HIPAA rules or are modifications needed either to address new challenges or because, in the
view of some, the rules were insufficient from the start? Are these concerns best addressed
through changes in statute or regulations, or is it best to police this nascent marketplace through
business best practices (or a combination of both)?
Addressing Privacy Concerns Through Anti-Discrimination Laws
 Enact federal legislation prohibiting the use of personal health information in determining
the terms and conditions of employment or health insurance coverage.
Lack of a Federal Breach Notification Standard
 Establish a federal breach notification law that applies to identifiable health information.
(ARRA)
 Status quo (i.e., leave for states address or to market forces).
Need for Data Stripped of Patient Identifiers for a Range of Health Purposes
 HHS could seek the input of experts and the public and examine the de-identification safe
harbor. This could help determine if it is still robust enough to provide a very low risk of
re-identification. If not, HHS could make any appropriate revisions to the Rule. (ARRA)
 Create more options for use of health data stripped of some individual identifiers, and
require data use agreements for all data disclosures (or at least all that do not meet the
threshold of full de-identification). (ARRA)
 At a minimum, require those who obtain data stripped of patient identifiers to commit to
not re-identifying the data, except in specific circumstances (for example, such as
notifications about a serious public health threat or drug safety/recall notifications)
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Prohibitions on Use of Personal Information for Marketing Purposes
 Strengthen HIPAA rules for use of personal information for marketing by covered
entities by requiring prior authorization in more circumstances. (ARRA) Establish rules
for use of information for marketing purposes by non-covered entities.
 Increase compliance with the Privacy Rule’s current provisions rule by issuing additional
guidance about the types of communications that are or are not “marketing.”
 Leave Rule as is for current covered entities but set more stringent rules for use of
information for marketing purposes by health information exchanges, and adopt rules
governing marketing uses by PHRs and Internet health sites.
 Change Rule to allow individuals to opt-out of receiving any marketing communications,
including those that today are exempt from the definition of marketing. (ARRA with
respect to fundraising by a covered entity)
 Leave current Rule as is and allow non-HIPAA covered entities to compete on the basis
of their policies with respect to use of information for marketing purposes (HIPAAcovered entities could also voluntarily implement more stringent controls on uses of
information for marketing purposes, and compete on that basis).
Other Areas Where HIPAA Could be Strengthened
 HHS could issue more guidance on how to comply with the Privacy Rule. (ARRA)
 HHS could examine the health care operations definition and issue new regulations that
limit the use of identifiable data without consent, which require more of the current
health care operations to be done with data stripped of some patient identifiers, and to
potentially require authorization for some uses that today are permitted without consent.
HHS could also issue guidance on the “minimum necessary” standard that encompasses
both the extent of data accessed and the extent of “identifiability” of the data, for health
care operations purposes. (ARRA)
 HHS should issue new regulations regarding the terms of access to health information
exchanges, including defining minimum standards for consumer choice.
 Filling gaps in HIPAA and establishing privacy protections that go beyond the HIPAA
floor through voluntary adherence to best practices or certification.
State Law Variation - Should we allow for some state law variation or establish federal
standards that preempt the field?
 Establish a federal health privacy law that preempts all state health privacy laws.
 Status quo - federal standards are a floor, with states able to adopt more protective
measures.
Improving Understanding of (and Compliance with) Privacy Protections: How do we
ensure compliance and appropriate enforcement of privacy protections?
Complexity of the Rule/Lack of Understanding
 Revise the Privacy Rule to make it less complex. For example, the rule could rely on
more on broadly worded fair information practices and principles and addressing detailed
circumstances through guidance, model policies, etc.)
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 Provide more guidance and better education on the requirements of the Rule to entities
covered by it. (ARRA)
 Better educate consumers on their HIPAA rights by requiring entities to provide a onepage summary privacy notice, written in plain English at average reading levels. This
could be provided in addition to the more detailed notice; HHS could come up with
models.
Compliance with the Rule and Enforcement
 Ensure that there is an enforcement regime to address entities not covered by HIPAA
that are handling personal health information. (ARRA)
 Amend the HIPAA statutory enforcement provisions to clarify current enforcement
authority. For example, require the Secretary to formally investigate, and impose civil
monetary penalties, in cases of willful neglect of the HIPAA rules; make it clear that the
Secretary can pursue civil actions in cases where a criminal violation may have occurred
but the Justice Department decides not to pursue the case; and correct the Office of Legal
Counsel’s interpretation of HIPAA with respect to the ability to pursue individuals who
violate HIPAA’s criminal provisions). (ARRA)
 Amend HIPAA to allow the Secretary of HHS to directly enforce the HIPAA regulations
against business associates.(ARRA)
 Amend HIPAA to provide a private right of action for individuals to seek redress for
HIPAA violations. (ARRA)
 Expressly authorize state authorities to also enforce the federal HIPAA rules. (ARRA)
 Status quo with respect to HIPAA enforcement provisions.
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APPENDIX B – Health Care Operations (defined at 45 CFR 164.501)
Health care operations means any of the following activities of the covered entity to the extent
that the activities are related to covered functions:
(1) Conducting quality assessment and improvement activities, including outcomes
evaluation and development of clinical guidelines, provided that the obtaining of
generalizable knowledge is not the primary purpose of any studies resulting from such
activities; population-based activities relating to improving health or reducing health care
costs, protocol development, case management and care coordination, contacting of health
care providers and patients with information about treatment alternatives; and related
functions that do not include treatment;
(2) Reviewing the competence or qualifications of health care professionals, evaluating
practitioner and provider performance, health plan performance, conducting training
programs in which students, trainees, or practitioners in areas of health care learn under
supervision to practice or improve their skills as health care providers, training of non-health
care professionals, accreditation, certification, licensing, or credentialing activities;
(3) Underwriting, premium rating, and other activities relating to the creation, renewal or
replacement of a contract of health insurance or health benefits, and ceding, securing, or
placing a contract for reinsurance of risk relating to claims for health care (including stoploss insurance and excess of loss insurance), provided that the requirements of §164.514(g)
are met, if applicable;
(4) Conducting or arranging for medical review, legal services, and auditing functions,
including fraud and abuse detection and compliance programs;
(5) Business planning and development, such as conducting cost-management and planningrelated analyses related to managing and operating the entity, including formulary
development and administration, development or improvement of methods of payment or
coverage policies; and
(6) Business management and general administrative activities of the entity, including, but
not limited to:
(i) Management activities relating to implementation of and compliance with the
requirements of this subchapter;
(ii) Customer service, including the provision of data analyses for policy holders, plan
sponsors, or other customers, provided that protected health information is not disclosed
to such policy holder, plan sponsor, or customer.
(iii) Resolution of internal grievances;
(iv) The sale, transfer, merger, or consolidation of all or part of the covered entity with
another covered entity, or an entity that following such activity will become a covered
entity and due diligence related to such activity; and
(v) Consistent with the applicable requirements of §164.514, creating de-identified health
information or a limited data set, and fundraising for the benefit of the covered entity.
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